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Comments

The Clash of the Acts: FEMA’s
Implementation of the National Flood
Insurance Program and its Collision with the
Endangered Species Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act
Ani Esenyan*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), a federal flood insurance
program that also aims to prevent flooding in flood-prone areas. However,
the structure and implementation of the NFIP has created mixed results.
FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP has been found to inadvertently
incentivize unsustainable floodplain development, which in turn threatens
species and their habitats protected by the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Over the years, FEMA has engaged in lawsuits and settlements
regarding its implementation of the NFIP. As a result of these lawsuits, the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) conducted scientific studies,

*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2019. I would like
to thank my Energy Law professor, Lara Fowler, for her invaluable guidance throughout
this process. I would also like to thank Molly Lawrence for taking the time to guide me
through this issue and share her expertise and insights.
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known as biological opinions (BiOp), which found that three particular
components of FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP are at the root of
FEMA’s ESA-noncompliance issues.
Additionally, one of these lawsuits resulted in a settlement which
required FEMA to conduct a Nationwide Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (NPEIS), a tool that comes from the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), evaluating the environmental impacts
of the NFIP. The NPEIS was published in November 2017. In the NPEIS,
FEMA asserts that its implementation of the NFIP does not impact
floodplain development, and that the agency is compliant with the ESA.
Accordingly, in the NPEIS, FEMA suggests four alternatives to the way
the NFIP is currently implemented. Then, in May 2018, FEMA issued the
Record of Decision (ROD), which finalizes FEMA’s decision to
implement the NPEIS’s Preferred Alternative. The Preferred Alternative
requires NFIP communities, meaning state and local governments, to
“obtain and maintain documentation” of ESA compliance as a condition
to issue floodplain development permits.
This Comment provides an overview of the NFIP, the ESA, the
litigation and consultation history, the NPEIS, the ROD, and makes three
conclusions: (1) FEMA’s imposition of ESA requirements on state and
local governments is an impermissible shift of its own ESAresponsibilities onto parties who have no legal obligation to comply with
the ESA; (2) FEMA lacks the authority to enforce its preferred alternative
under the existing regulation; and (3) the ESA compliance requirement of
the alternatives is a significant burden on NFIP communities. Based on
these conclusions, FEMA’s implementation of its Preferred Alternative is
unwise.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Flood Insurance Program1 (NFIP) was enacted with the
noble intention of providing federally-backed flood insurance to
Americans who did not have this form of coverage from the private
market.2 The NFIP was also enacted to prevent future flooding in floodprone areas. 3 However, the structure of the NFIP is flawed, which has led
to severe criticism over the years.4 The NFIP’s ineffectiveness has been
highlighted in the wave of hurricanes in Texas, Florida, and the Caribbean
because the NFIP was “not designed to handle catastrophic losses like
1. National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. ch. 50 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a), (c) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also DIANE P. HORN &
JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 2 (2018) (explaining that the interrelated policy
purposes of the NFIP are “(1) to provide access to primary flood insurance, thereby
allowing for the transfer of some of the financial risk of property owners to the federal
government, and (2) to mitigate and reduce the nation’s comprehensive flood risk through
the development and implementation of floodplain management standards”).
3. See HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See infra Section II.A.2.
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those caused by Harvey, Irma, and Maria.”5 Moreover, because of the
NFIP’s structure, it is unclear how those affected by hurricanes will
manage their losses.6 While a primary criticism of the NFIP is that the
program is fiscally unsound, the NFIP has also faced an unexpected clash
with the Endangered Species Act of 19737 (ESA).8
The NFIP’s administering agency, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), is at the center of this clash. Courts
addressing this issue have concluded that FEMA’s implementation of the
NFIP jeopardizes ESA-listed species and their habitats.9 Courts have
reached this conclusion because FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP has
been found to encourage development in the floodplain, which in turn
jeopardizes these species.10 The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively known as the
“Services”) conducted scientific studies that echo courts’ findings.11
Specifically, three components of FEMA’s NFIP implementation
have been linked to perpetuating the ESA clash: (1) FEMA’s minimum
floodplain management criteria, (2) FEMA’s Community Rating System
Program (CRS Program), and (3) FEMA’s floodplain mapping program.12
These three components of NFIP implementation were found to be
discretionary federal agency actions.13 Accordingly, FEMA’s obligations
under Section 7 of the ESA, which focuses on discretionary, federal
agency actions that may jeopardize ESA-species and their habitats, were
triggered.14
For years, FEMA has been sued for ESA violations, and FEMA
settled a number of those cases.15 In particular, one of FEMA’s settlements
resulted in the issuance of a Nationwide Programmatic Environmental
Impact Study (NPEIS) for the NFIP.16
5. Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/a-broke-andbroken-flood-insurance-program.html (internal citations omitted).
6. See id.
7. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
8. See infra Section II.C.
9. See infra Section II.C.
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section II.C.
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See infra Section II.C.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also SANDRA B. ZELLMER & JAN
G. LAITOS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 218 (2014).
15. See infra Section II.C.
16. Settlement Agreement at 4, WildEarth Guardians v. FEMA, No. 10-CV-863PHX-NVM (D. Az. Mar. 22, 2012); see also Molly Lawrence, National Flood Insurance
Program: The Changing Landscape of Floodplain Insurance & Regulation, THE WATER
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The NPEIS is a study that FEMA conducted which assesses the
NFIP’s impact on the environment.17 The NPEIS instructed FEMA to
provide “alternatives” for how to implement the NFIP.18 In accordance
with those instructions, FEMA proposed four alternatives.19 Three of the
four alternatives propose changes to the NFIP that would require state and
local governments and individuals seeking floodplain development
permits to “obtain and maintain documentation” that would demonstrate
compliance with the ESA.20 In May 2018, FEMA announced through the
Record of Decision (ROD) that the agency would implement FEMA’s
“Preferred Alternative,” Alternative 2, to modify the NFIP.21 This
Comment will focus on the legality of Alternative 2,22 and will ultimately
conclude that FEMA is unwise for implementing Alternative 2.23
This Comment will guide readers through this clash of acts.24
Specifically, Part II provides background information on the NFIP, the
ESA, the litigation history concerning the NFIP-ESA clash, as well as the
results of Biological Opinions (BiOps),25 the NPEIS, and the ROD.26
Then, Part III analyzes three specific issues with Alternative 2.27
First, FEMA impermissibly shifts its ESA responsibilities onto state and
local governments, as well as individuals seeking floodplain development
REP., Jan. 15, 2014, at 1, 11 (Jan. 15, 2014); infra Section II.D (discussing the NPEIS
requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act).
17. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
FINAL NATIONWIDE PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1-1 (2017)
[hereinafter FEMA, NFIP NPEIS].
18. See id. at 2-1.
19. See infra Section II.D.
20. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-15 to -17.
21. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
RECORD OF DECISION 1 (2018) [hereinafter FEMA, NFIP ROD].
22. Alternatives 3 and 4 include similar language to Alternative 2 and pose similar
legal issues, but because Alternative 2 is to be enforced, this Comment primarily focuses
on Alternative 2.
23. See infra Section III.D and Part IV.
24. The collision of FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP and the ESA has been a
contentious issue for years, and this issue is constantly evolving and has a number of
elements. This comment is current regarding FEMA’s ROD, but the comment neither
considers ongoing litigation on this issue nor potential legislative changes. This comment
also does not consider the impact that climate change has on the NFIP. This comment
narrowly focuses on the litigation history of this issue and FEMA’s NPEIS and ROD. Since
publication of this comment, the United States has seen another devasting natural disaster,
Hurricane Florence, which likely will also impact statistics, criticism, and updates to the
NFIP.
25. BiOps are scientific studies that evaluate the impact of a federal agency’s action
on the environment and species. See infra Section II.C.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
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permits.28 Second, FEMA improperly interprets an existing regulation as
its authority to impose this requirement onto state and local governments
and permit-seekers.29 Third, FEMA’s imposition of these requirements
creates a significant burden for permit-seekers as well as state and local
governments to bear.30
Ultimately, this Comment recommends that FEMA should address
its ESA-noncompliance issues directly by modifying its management of
the NFIP, instead of implementing Alternative 2.31 This Comment
contends that FEMA should have retracted or revised its proposed
Alternatives.32 Finally, this Comment suggests that FEMA should enact a
new regulation that would undergo public notice and comment if the
agency feels strongly that the ESA compliance requirements should be
part of the NFIP.33 Part IV provides a summary of this Comment.34
II.

BACKGROUND

The clash of the acts resulting from FEMA’s implementation of the
NFIP is complex, as is the NFIP itself, and requires an explanation of a
variety of concepts before this Comment’s analysis and recommendation
can be fully appreciated.
A.

National Flood Insurance Program

The National Flood Insurance Act of 196835 (NFIA) created the
NFIP.36 The NFIP was created to provide federally-supported flood
insurance policies to those in flood-prone areas, and to prevent future
flooding through a national floodplain management program.37 The
motivation to create such a program stemmed from a gap in flood
insurance coverage, as “private insurers either stopped selling flood
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See infra Section III.B.
30. See infra Section III.C.
31. See infra Section III.D.
32. See infra Section III.D.
33. See infra Section III.D.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 50)
36. Id.; National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. ch. 50 (2012 & Supp. 2017);
see also HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 1.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a), (c); HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that the
interrelated policy purposes of the NFIP are “(1) to provide access to primary flood
insurance, thereby allowing for the transfer of some of the financial risk of property owners
to the federal government, and (2) to mitigate and reduce the nation’s comprehensive flood
risk through the development and implementation of floodplain management standards”).
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insurance policies or began charging very high premiums because the
[flood insurance] business became too risky.”38 FEMA is the managing
agency of the NFIP, and FEMA fulfills its duty through its subcomponent,
the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA).39
The NFIP has been amended a number of times.40 The most relevant
amendments to this Comment are the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 201241 (BW-12) and the Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 201442 (HFIAA). BW-12 “authorized and funded the
national mapping program,” and increased flood insurance rates so that the
actual financial risk of flooding would be reflected in the insurance rate.43
Two years after BW-12 was enacted, HFIAA repealed certain parts of
BW-12, put limits on certain insurance rate increases, and updated
mechanisms to ensure the fiscal soundness of the NFIP.44 Although the
legislative amendments to the NFIP aimed to improve the program, NFIP
implementation continues to face challenges regarding achievement of the
program’s intended goals, as well as challenges with ESA compliance.
1. Breakdown of NFIP Implementation
In addition to the NFIP’s primary purpose of providing flood
insurance, the NFIP is critically important to reducing “comprehensive
flood risk[s].”45 The NFIP relies on community involvement and the
adoption of local land use laws and ordinances to achieve the NFIP’s vital
flood-minimization goal.46 To accomplish this goal, the NFIP urges state
and local governments to modify their local land use laws to minimize the
38. Editorial, The Holes in Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y854hpkw.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a) (“[T]he Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency is authorized to establish and carry out a national flood insurance
program which will enable interested persons to purchase insurance against loss resulting
from physical damage to or loss of real property or personal property related thereto arising
from any flood occurring in the United States.”); see also HORN & BROWN, supra note 2,
at 1.
40. See Flood Insurance Reform – The Law, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Jan.
26, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance-reform-law.
41. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 50 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
42. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128
Stat. 1020 (2014) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch. 50 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
43. Flood Insurance Reform - The Law, supra note 40.
44. See id.
45. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 2 & n.12 (explaining that “comprehensive flood
risk means that the risk includes both financial risk (i.e., physical damage to the property),
but also the risk to human life”).
46. See id. at 2.
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development of land that would otherwise be susceptible to flood
damage.47
Community48 participation in the NFIP is voluntary, and FEMA is
only allowed to provide flood insurance to communities that have adopted
land use laws that reflect “the comprehensive criteria for land management
and use,” known as the “minimum floodplain management criteria.”49 The
minimum floodplain management criteria were promulgated by FEMA
through federal regulation 44 C.F.R. § 60.3.50 Communities can gain
access to the NFIP by adopting FEMA’s minimum floodplain
management criteria through enacting local or state laws.51 These criteria
intend to:
(1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage
where appropriate, (2) guide the development of proposed construction
away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards, (3) assist
in reducing damage caused by floods, and (4) otherwise improve the
long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas.52

While FEMA has established minimum standards for NFIP
participation through federal regulations,53 those “standards only have the
force of law because they are adopted and enforced by state or local
government[s].”54 Therefore, if state or local governments fail to adopt
these standards, participation in the NFIP will not occur and the goals of
the NFIP will not be accomplished.55 FEMA’s implementation of the
minimum floodplain management criteria is the first component of NFIP
implementation that contributed to FEMA’s noncompliance with the
ESA.56
After enacting state or local laws, NFIP communities are also
responsible for enforcing the minimum floodplain management criteria.57
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
48. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2018) (definition of community that participates in the
NFIP, also known as “NFIP community”).
49. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c)(2) (2012 & Supp.
2017)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4102 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (criteria for land management and
use).
50. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2018); see infra Section III.B (discussing FEMA’s expansive
interpretation of this regulation to support its authority to enforce Alternative 2).
51. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c)(2)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 4102 (criteria for land management and use).
52. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c)).
53. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2018).
54. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 6.
55. Id. at 2.
56. See infra Section II.C.
57. See HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 7.
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In fact, these communities can choose to adopt more stringent floodplain
management criteria than FEMA’s minimum requirements.58 FEMA
incentivizes NFIP communities to adopt more stringent standards through
the CRS Program.59 The CRS Program’s purpose is to incentivize
measures that “reduce the risk of flood or erosion damage,” “protect
natural and beneficial floodplain functions,” and decrease federal flood
insurance losses.60 Through the CRS Program, FEMA awards points that
“increase a community’s ‘class’ rating in the CRS on a scale of 1 to 10.”61
As communities gather points to increase their class, they are given
discounts on their policy premiums.62
Community participation and adoption of appropriate local land use
laws and ordinances are critical to the functionality of the NFIP, and
contribute to the flood-reduction goals of the NFIP.63 While the CRS
Program nobly intends to minimize flood risks, this program is the second
component of NFIP implementation that contributed to FEMA’s
noncompliance with the ESA.64
In addition to encouraging communities to adopt appropriate land use
measures and to participate in the CRS Program, the NFIP addresses its
flood-reduction goal through its floodplain mapping process, which begins
with FEMA conducting Flood Insurance Studies (FIS).65 FISs are national
studies that identify areas that have “special flood, mudslide, and floodrelated erosion hazards.”66 FISs also assess the “flood risk . . . and
designate insurance zones.”67 FEMA uses the FISs in collaboration with
NFIP communities to develop Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) that
“depict the community’s flood risk and floodplain.”68 One important
aspect of FIRMs is the specific focus on identifying Special Flood Hazard
Areas (SFHA).69 SFHAs are flood risk zones that have a chance of
flooding during a “1 in 100 year flood,” meaning that these properties have
a “one percent or greater risk of flooding every year.”70

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id 7–8.
42 U.S.C. § 4022(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 18.
See id. at 18–19.
See id. at 6–7.
See infra Section II.C.
See HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The significance of FIRMs and SFHAs is that these maps and areas
help determine both flood insurance rates and whether flood insurance
policies are mandatory.71 Given the significance of FIRMs, NFIP
communities must “pass the map into [their] local or state law in order for
the map to be effective.”72 The mapping process is the third component of
NFIP implementation that contributed to FEMA’s noncompliance with the
ESA.73
2. Current State of the NFIP
The current state of the NFIP is troublesome, as acknowledged by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) inclusion of the NFIP
on its High Risk List.74 The High Risk List is updated every two years with
the start of a new Congress and identifies “the agencies and program areas
that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation.”75
The primary problem with the NFIP is that it is seriously indebted to
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury).76 This debt stems from
the NFIP’s inability to “generate sufficient revenues to repay” the money
that was borrowed from the Treasury “to cover claims from the 2005 and
2012 hurricanes or potential claims related to future catastrophic losses.”77
The GAO identifies a key problem with the NFIP: “Since the program
offers rates that do not fully reflect the risk of flooding, [the] NFIP’s
overall rate-setting structure was not designed to be actuarially sound in
the aggregate, nor was it intended to generate sufficient funds to fully
cover actual losses.”78
While there are overarching programmatic problems with the NFIP,
FEMA’s implementation of three particular components of the NFIP—(1)
the minimum floodplain management criteria, (2) the CRS program, and
(3) the mapping process—have brought FEMA into noncompliance with
71. See id. at 9, 14 (noting that the flood insurance can either be NFIP insurance, or it
can be private insurance that is “at least as broad as the coverage of the NFIP”) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
72. HORN & BROWN, supra note 2, at 3.
73. See infra Section II.C.
74. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS
619 (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-317].
75. High
Risk
List,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/overview (last visited Dec. 8, 2018) (emphasis added).
76. GAO-17-317, supra note 74, at 619.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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the ESA.79 Specifically, FEMA is not in compliance with Section 7 of the
ESA because courts and BiOps have found that FEMA’s implementation
of those three components of the NFIP has the potential to jeopardize
ESA-listed species.80
B.

The Endangered Species Act

The ESA is a conservation statute that was created after various
species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States went extinct due
to economic growth and development.81 The ESA’s purpose is to use
conservation programs to protect species of fish, wildlife, and plants that
have been listed as threatened82 or endangered83 with extinction.84 All
federal departments and agencies are required to conserve threatened or
endangered species in the course of their federal actions.85
The NMFS and FWS (collectively known as the “Services”) are
responsible for administering the ESA.86 The NMFS’s role is to work with
federal agencies whose actions may affect a species listed as threatened or
endangered for ESA’s Section 7(a)(2) consultation requirement.87
Additionally, the NMFS issues BiOps as part of the consultation
requirement.88 The FWS is responsible for working with states, tribes,
private landowners, non-governmental organizations, and federal partners
to conserve species and habitats.89 The FWS also plays a role in
consultations and issues BiOps.90
BiOps are researched and published by the Services, and detail the
Services’ opinion as to “whether the Federal [agency] action is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species, or result in the
79. See infra Section II.C.
80. See infra Section II.C.
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (“The term ‘threatened species’ means
any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (“The term ‘endangered species’ means any species which is
in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . . .”).
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1).
86. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2017).
87. Endangered Species Act Consultations, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/consultations#endangered-species-act-consultations
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018); see infra text accompanying note 95.
88. See Endangered Species Act Consultations, supra note 87.
89. See ESA Implementation Overview, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_esa/index.html (last updated June 6, 2018).
90. Consultations,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/faq.html#3 (last updated Dec. 6, 2018).
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destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.”91 If the BiOp
concludes that the agency action will jeopardize the species at issue, or its
habitat, then the NMFS must suggest “reasonable and prudent
alternatives” (RPA) to the agency action that will help the agency avoid
jeopardy.92
Primarily at issue in this Comment is Section 7 of the ESA. Section
7’s purpose is to ensure that actions “authorized, funded, or carried out”
by federal agencies are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . .”93 Section 7
obligations of a federal agency are triggered when the agency makes an
“affirmative, discretionary decision” to undertake the action.94
Federal agencies are required by Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA to
consult with the FWS or the NMFS to ensure that their agency actions will
not jeopardize endangered or threatened species.95 The consultation with
the Services results in a BiOp and the presentation of RPAs if necessary.96
Other sections of the ESA that are relevant to this Comment are
Section 9 and Section 10. Section 9 of the ESA makes it illegal for any
person subject to United States jurisdiction to “take” any ESA-listed
species.97 The ESA defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.”98 Section 10 of the ESA, on the other hand, issues permits
which allow for an action to occur that would otherwise be considered a
“take” under the ESA.99 These are referred to as “incidental take
permits.”100 As part of the permit issuance, the permittee must create a
conservation plan that demonstrates the “impact that will result from such
taking,” the steps and funding that the permittee will take and secure to
minimize and mitigate the impacts, and the alternative actions that were
considered by the applicant.101

91. Id.
92. See ZELLMER & LAITOS, supra note 14, at 218.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
94. ZELLMER & LAITOS, supra note 14, at 218.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). This process is commonly referred to as “Section 7
consultation.”
96. ZELLMER & LAITOS, supra note 14, at 219.
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
100. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 508 (3d ed. 2013).
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
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Because of the unintended adverse impact that FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP has on ESA-listed species and their habitats,
there is a clash between FEMA’s agency action of implementing the NFIP
and the agency’s responsibilities under Section 7 of the ESA.102
C.

Litigation History of the NFIP-ESA Clash and Results of the
BiOps

For a number of years, FEMA has been engaged in litigation focused
on whether the agency’s administration and implementation of the NFIP
jeopardizes endangered species.103 A number of court holdings, settlement
agreements, and BiOps issued by the Services ultimately found that
FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP did in fact put endangered species at
risk,104 thus triggering the agency to fulfill its ESA responsibilities.105
In Florida Key Deer v. Paulison,106 the Eleventh Circuit ruled on
years of litigation and consultations with the FWS regarding FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP in the Florida Keys.107 The court found that
FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP in Florida jeopardized Florida Key
deer and other ESA-listed species.108 Specifically, the court held that
Section 7 requirements were triggered by FEMA’s administration of the
NFIP because (1) certain components of FEMA’s administration of the
NFIP are discretionary and therefore trigger Section 7 obligations, and (2)
FEMA’s administration of the NFIP is “a relevant cause of jeopardy to the
listed species” because FEMA has the authority to prevent the indirect
effects associated with the issuance of flood insurance.109 To support this
latter statement, the court provided an example of FEMA’s ability to
modify flood insurance eligibility requirements to prevent jeopardy to
listed species.110 The court also pointed out that the FWS consultation
process found that “the NFIP jeopardizes listed species because

102. See infra Section II.C.
103. See infra Section II.C.
104. See supra Section II.A (discussing the three components of the NFIP that have
been found to violate the ESA); see also Section II.C (discussing these three NFIP
components in the context of judicial decisions, settlements, and BiOps).
105. See infra Section II.C.
106. Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008).
107. Id. at 1148.
108. Id. at 1139–40.
109. Id. at 1141–44 (“[FEMA’s] administration of the NFIP is a relevant cause of
jeopardy of listed species . . . because development is encouraged and in effect authorized
by FEMA’s issuance of flood insurance.”).
110. Id. at 1144.
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development is encouraged and in effect authorized by FEMA’s issuance
of flood insurance.”111
In National Wildlife Federation v. FEMA,112 the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) and Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility sued FEMA “alleging that FEMA violated Section 7(a)(2)
of the ESA by not consulting with the [NMFS] on the impacts of the
[NFIP] on the Puget Sound chinook salmon, a threatened species.”113 The
plaintiffs argued that FEMA’s agency action of implementing the NFIP in
Washington State’s Puget Sound might put the endangered salmon species
at risk because “some aspects of the NFIP encourage development in the
floodplains,” and the salmon rely on the affected habitat.114 In response,
FEMA argued that the ESA consultation requirement did not apply to them
because “the NFIP is not a discretionary ‘agency action’ subject to Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA,” and the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that “FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP ‘may affect’ the Puget Sound chinook
salmon.”115
The court held that FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP did trigger
Section 7 obligations for two reasons.116 First, FEMA’s implementation of
the NFIP indeed fell under the definition of “agency action,” and is a
discretionary action, thus Section 7(a)(2) applies to FEMA.117 Second,
FEMA’s agency action of implementing the NFIP impacts development
which may affect the listed species.118 The court noted that even though
the impact is an indirect effect, the action still triggers ESA
requirements.119
The court ultimately ordered a formal consultation with the NMFS,
which resulted in a BiOp for the Puget Sound.120 The BiOp examined the
three components of FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP that the court
in NWF v. FEMA held required ESA consultation: (1) the floodplain
mapping program, (2) the minimum floodplain management criteria for

111. Id.
112. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
113. Id. at 1153–54.
114. Id. at 1154.
115. Id. at 1168.
116. Id. at 1169, 1172–77.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1176–77; see NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NMFS TRACKING NO. 200600472, FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE ON-GOING NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM CARRIED OUT IN THE PUGET SOUND AREA IN WASHINGTON STATE (2008)
[hereinafter NMFS, WASH. BIO. OP.].
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community inclusion in the NFIP, and (3) the CRS Program.121 The BiOp
concluded that “FEMA’s activities do lead to floodplain development in
Washington State, some of which affects the habitat of listed species.”122
The BiOp found that the “three elements of the NFIP [listed above]
directly and indirectly lead to changes in the floodplain environments and
eventually lead to floodplain development. These changes in the
floodplain environment adversely affect the habitat and habitat forming
processes for listed species in the Puget Sound region.”123
In addition to the case in Washington State that resulted in a BiOp,
another BiOp was issued as a result of a lawsuit in Oregon.124 In 2010,
FEMA entered into a settlement agreement with the Audubon Society of
Portland, the North West Environmental Defense Center and other
entities.125 FEMA was engaged in this litigation as a result of the groups’
claim that FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP threated ESA-listed
species in Oregon.126 FEMA settled this lawsuit by agreeing to consult
with the NMFS to fulfill its Section 7 obligations.127
The NMFS released the BiOp for the affected Oregon area in April
2016.128 The BiOp analyzed both the direct and indirect effects of FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP in Oregon on ESA-listed species.129
Specifically, the BiOp focused on the discretionary elements of FEMA’s
NFIP implementation: (1) regulatory floodplain management criteria, (2)
floodplain mapping, and (3) the CRS Program.130 The BiOp addressed
“whether FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP can be said to ‘cause’
121. NMFS, WASH. BIO. OP., supra note 120, at 3–23, 83.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 83; see also NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NMFS TRACKING NO. NWR2011-3197, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM IN THE STATE OF OREGON 138 (2016) [hereinafter NMFS, OR. BIO.
OP.] (stating that in the Washington BiOp, the question of whether FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP could “cause” floodplain development was considered, and
NMFS concluded that the “NFIP both facilitates floodplain development and establishes
the land-use and construction standards pursuant to which such development may occur”).
124. Biological Opinion on the NFIP in Oregon, OREGON DEP’T OF LAND
CONSERVATION & DEV., https://www.oregon.gov/lcd/NH/Pages/BiOp.aspx (last visited
Nov. 28, 2018).
125. Settlement Agreement and Proposed Order at 1–2, Audubon Soc’y of Portland v.
FEMA, No. 3:09-cv-729-HA (D. Or. 2010)(adopted by court July 12, 2010) [hereinafter
Audubon Settlement].
126. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 9; see also Audubon Settlement, supra note 125, at
1–2.
127. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 9; see also Audubon Settlement, supra note 125, at
1–2.
128. See NMFS, OR. BIO. OP., supra note 123, at 1.
129. See id. at 6, 138.
130. Id. at 11.
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floodplain development, which affects habitat functions and features
relied on by [the ESA-listed species.]”131 The BiOp concluded that the
three discretionary components of NFIP implementation lead to
development in the floodplain.132 Moreover, the BiOp found that FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP had several “weaknesses,” and the NMFS
concluded that these weaknesses indicate that NFIP implementation does
not guarantee the survival and recovery of these species.133
As part of the BiOp, the NMFS provided FEMA with RPAs to more
effectively administer the NFIP in a manner that would not jeopardize
ESA-listed species or their designated habitats.134 FEMA has an obligation
to act on the RPAs, but as of June 6, 2017, the date on which the public
comment period135 for the NPEIS closed, FEMA had not provided Oregon
with any direction regarding what to do with the BiOp findings and
RPAs.136 Commentators on the NPEIS stated that this has caused a state
of uncertainty in Oregon because the parties responsible for permitting and
other governmental functions are unclear as to how the NPEIS and Oregon
BiOp are supposed to interact, and these parties are effectively at a
standstill without guidance from FEMA on how to proceed.137
In addition to the cases from Florida and Washington State that saw
their way through the courts and the settlement in Oregon, FEMA settled

131. Id. at 138.
132. Id. at 141.
133. Id. at 142.
134. Id. at 274.
135. See infra Section II.D for discussion of the NPEIS process.
136. Jim Rue, Dir., Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation and Dev., Comment Letter on
Proposed NFIP NPEIS (June 2, 2017) [hereinafter Rue Comment],
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0062; see also Alexandra
Howard, FEMA BiOp Program Manager, City of Portland Office of Mgmt. and Finance,
Comment Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS (June 6, 2017) [hereinafter Howard Comment],
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0065.
137. Rue Comment, supra note 136; Howard Comment, supra note 136.

2019

THE CLASH OF THE ACTS

515

lawsuits in New Mexico,138 California,139 and Arizona140 regarding the
issue of whether FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP jeopardizes ESAlisted species in specific regions of those states. The settlement in Arizona
is notable because it resulted in FEMA’s obligation to prepare the
NPEIS.141
The common thread among the above-mentioned cases, BiOps, and
settlement agreements is the three components of the NFIP that are
implemented by FEMA and found to jeopardize ESA-listed species. These
components are (1) the minimum floodplain management criteria, (2)
floodplain mapping, and (3) the CRS Program. FEMA has an obligation
to address the issues with these components. Indeed, by conducting the
NPEIS, FEMA began to accept responsibility for the flaws in its
implementation of the NFIP.142 However, there are a number of issues with
the NPEIS, and this Comment will specifically focus on three issues with
the Alternative 2.143
138. Ben Rubin, FEMA Settles Another Lawsuit Challenging Implementation of the
National Flood Insurance Program, ENDANGERED SPECIES LAW & POL’Y (Nossaman LLP,
Feb. 24, 2011), https://bit.ly/2DlCsBY. Here, FEMA settled a lawsuit with the
environmental nonprofit WildEarth Guardians. As part of the settlement, FEMA was
required to engage the Services in formal consultation for its Section 7 obligations in order
to determine the effect of the NFIP’s implementation on ESA-listed species in New
Mexico. Specifically, the consultation was required to evaluate the impact of FEMA’s
implementation of the minimum floodplain management criteria, FEMA’s mapping
practices, and the implementation of the CSR Program. See Stipulated Settlement
Agreement & Proposed Order at 3, WildEarth Guardians v. FEMA, No. 1:09-cv-00882RB/WDS (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter WildEarth Settlement].
139. See Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. FEMA, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
see also Settlement Agreement & Proposed Order at 2–3, Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v.
FEMA, No. 1:09-cv-02024-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2012) [hereinafter CSFAD Settlement];
FEMA Settles Citizen Suit; Agrees to Consult on Floodplain Program’s Impacts on Listed
Fish in the Delta, ENDANGERED SPECIES LAW AND POL’Y (Nossaman LLP, Feb. 24, 2011),
https://bit.ly/2qsqFZW. Here, FEMA entered into a settlement agreement with the
Coalition for a Sustainable Delta and the Kern County Water Agency, regarding FEMA’s
administration of the NFIP in certain areas of California. CSFAD Settlement, supra, at 1–
2. The settlement required FEMA to enter into formal consultation with the Services based
on the agency’s Section 7 obligations to determine the effects of the agency’s
implementation of the NFIP on ESA-listed species in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta. Id. at 2–3.
140. WildEarth Settlement, supra note 138, at 2; see also Lawrence, supra note 16, at
11. Here, FEMA entered into yet another settlement agreement with WildEarth Guardians
regarding the agency’s implementation of the NFIP in Arizona, and how the
implementation impacts ESA-listed species.
141. WildEarth Settlement, supra note 138, at 4.
142. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, No. C11-2044-RSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151386, at *12–13, *22–58 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2014) (discussing FEMA’s
implementation of RPAs from the Washington BiOp).
143. See infra Section II.D.
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Overview of FEMA’s Nationwide Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement

The NFIP is in need of modification, and as the administrator of the
NFIP, FEMA must make modifications to the program for two reasons:
(1) to comply with the legislative requirements of BW-12 and HFIAA, and
(2) to “comply, or demonstrate compliance, with the requirements of
Section 7 of the [ESA].”144 In the NPEIS, FEMA explained that the drivers
behind the program changes required by BW-12 and HFIAA are the “fiscal
soundness” of the NFIP, and the need for premium rates to reflect the true
risks faced by these properties as a consequence of flooding.145 To explain
the programmatic changes required to demonstrate ESA compliance,
FEMA stated:
The need to demonstrate compliance with the ESA stems from the
many and varying statements from Federal agencies and the public
about FEMA’s compliance with the ESA, and the perception about the
nature of the NFIP and its effects on ESA-listed species and designated
critical habitats. FEMA determined that it is currently in compliance
with the ESA, but recognizes the need to make program changes that
demonstrate ESA compliance to the public.146

FEMA prepared the NPEIS based on its obligations under the
National Environmental Policy Act147 (NEPA).148 NEPA “requires federal
agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior
to making decisions.”149 NEPA also requires federal agencies to “prepare
detailed statements assessing the environmental impact of and alternatives
to major federal actions significantly affecting the environment.”150
Another component of the EIS process is the requirement that the EIS
be updated on the Federal Register and open for public comments.151
FEMA published the draft NPEIS in April 2017 and allowed a 60-day
comment period during which 29 comments from individuals,

144. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-6, 2-1.
145. Id. at 1-6.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–35, 4341–
47 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
148. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-23.
149. What is the National Environmental Policy Act?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/nepa/what-national-environmental-policy-act.
150. Id. These statements are commonly referred to as Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS) and Environmental Assessments (EA).
151. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-24 to -26.
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environmental non-profits, non-profits representing various interests, and
city and state governments were submitted.152
FEMA determined that the NEPA analysis should be conducted at a
nationwide programmatic level, as programmatic environmental
documents are “prepared when an agency is proposing to carry out a broad
action, program, or policy.”153 FEMA prepared the NPEIS to evaluate the
proposed modifications to the NFIP.154 The NPEIS evaluated the potential
impacts on the natural and human environment associated with the NFIP,
and also evaluated alternative NFIP-modification proposals.155 Based on
the completion of the NPEIS, FEMA stated that it had met its NEPA
obligations to “consider potential environmental impacts of the
Alternatives,” and that the NPEIS will “assist[] in the decision-making
process on future program modifications to the NFIP.”156
The Final NPEIS was published in November 2017, and the purpose
of the study was to provide a “baseline analysis of the environmental
impacts of the NFIP, as well as the impacts of implementing certain
changes required by BW-12 and HFIAA and demonstrating compliance
with the ESA.”157
Under NEPA, “any agency proposing a major Federal action . . .
must consider a range of reasonable alternatives” to the considered
action.158 FEMA included four alternatives as part of the NPEIS.159
Alternative 1 is the “No Action” alternative, which would continue
implementation of the NFIP as it currently exists.160 No Action alternatives
are generally included in environmental impact statements as a
“benchmark against which impacts of the alternatives can be evaluated.”161
Alternative 2 is FEMA’s “Preferred Alternative” and ultimately the
alternative decided upon in the ROD.162 Alternative 2 includes changes
that would address the legislative change requirements of BW-12 and
HFIAA.163 In addition to those changes, Alternative 2 would require NFIP

152. See Comments on National Flood Insurance Program Nationwide Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement, https://bit.ly/2PQ5POz (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
153. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-23; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (2018).
154. See FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-1.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1-23.
157. Id. at 1-24.
158. Id. at 2-1 (“major Federal action” is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2018)).
159. See id. at 2-15 to -17.
160. Id. at 2-16.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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communities, pursuant to 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2),164 to “obtain and
maintain documentation of compliance with the appropriate Federal or
State laws, including the ESA, as a condition of issuing permits to develop
in the floodplain.”165 Additionally, Alternative 2 would require that flood
map change requests (also known as Letter of Map Change or LOMC) be
“contingent on the community, or the project proponent on the
community’s behalf, submitting documentation of compliance with the
ESA.”166
Similar to Alternative 2, Alternatives 3 and 4 include the legislatively
required changes, and include language that would delegate ESA
compliance responsibilities to the NFIP communities.167 Whether FEMA
can make communities responsible for these requirements is debatable,
and a number of commentators on the draft NPEIS argued against the
aspects of FEMA’s alternatives that delegate ESA responsibility to NFIP
communities.168
E.

Overview of FEMA’s Record of Decision

In May 2018, FEMA published the ROD, which announced that the
agency will implement Alternative 2 to modify the NFIP.169 FEMA found
that Alternative 2 “is fully within FEMA’s discretion” and “meets
FEMA’s purpose and need, causes no adverse environmental impact, and
meets FEMA’s desired timeframe for taking action.”170 In the ROD,
FEMA again stated171 that the agency would have preferred to implement
Alternatives 3 or 4, but the agency could not reach an agreement with the
Services.172 FEMA also reiterated that the agency has no land use
164. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2018) sets out the minimum floodplain management criteria for
NFIP communities, and 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) governs the permitting aspect of the
minimum floodplain management criteria. FEMA’s expansive interpretation of this
regulation is discussed in Section III.B.
165. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-16.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2-16 to -17.
168. See infra Part III.
169. FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at 1, 13 (“FEMA’s decision is to proceed with
the preferred alternative, Alternative 2, to implement the legislatively required changes,
floodplain management criteria guidance, and mapping modifications.”).
170. Id. at 1, 5.
171. See FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-21 (“Alternatives 3 and 4 would
meet the purpose and need, but after an extensive coordination effort with the Services,
FEMA has been unable to secure the Services’ concurrence on either alternative.”).
172. FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at 1–2, 7, 11, 13 (“FEMA’s original preference
was to pursue PEIS Alternative #3 which would have allowed FEMA to demonstrate
compliance with both sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2) of the ESA in this effort.”). Alternative
3 was the “Environmentally Preferred Alternative.” FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at
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authority.173 The ROD incorporates the Draft and Final NPEIS by
reference. 174
In the ROD, FEMA highlights that the agency addressed the issue of
the effects of the implementation of the NFIP through the Biological
Evaluation175 (BE) it completed in connection with the NPEIS.176 FEMA
reiterates that the BE found that “because the NFIP does not cause,
incentivize, facilitate, or otherwise encourage private floodplain
development to occur, the implementation of the NFIP at the national level
had no effects on ESA-listed species and habitat.”177 FEMA also explains
that ESA compliance is achieved through Alternative 2 because
“floodplain management and mapping-related clarifications made in PEIS
Alternative 2 clarify that private project proponents are responsible for
ensuring that private floodplain development is carried out in an ESAcompliant manner and that NFIP communities are responsible for
obtaining and maintaining documentation that private floodplain
development is ESA-compliant.”178 The ROD also says that FEMA is
meeting with the Services “on a monthly basis to discuss a number of
changes proposed by FEMA in furtherance of its obligations under Section
7(a)(1) of the ESA.”179
Thus far, this Comment has provided an overview of the NFIP, the
ESA, and the litigation history and BiOps reflecting FEMA’s
noncompliance with the ESA.180 Additionally, this Comment has provided
an overview of the NPEIS and ROD.181 These concepts are key to
understanding the ultimate argument of this Comment.

10. Under NEPA, when an agency prepares an EIS and then publishes a subsequent ROD,
the agency is required to identify the Environmentally Preferred Alternative, which is the
alternative that is considered to be “environmentally preferable”. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2
(2018). The Environmentally Preferred Alternative is “the alternative that causes the least
damage to the biological and physical environment; it also means the alternative that best
protects, preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and natural resources.” FEMA, NFIP
ROD, supra note 21, at 10.
173. FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at 2; see also infra Section III.A for FEMA’s
position on its land use authority as stated in the NPEIS.
174. FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at 2.
175. See supra Section III.A
176. FEMA, NFIP ROD, supra note 21, at 13.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 13–14.
179. Id. at 14.
180. See supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
181. See supra Section II.D.
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ANALYSIS

This Comment argues that FEMA abused its authority as NFIP
administrator in setting the terms of Alternative 2 and ultimately deciding
to implement this alternative.182 FEMA abused its authority because the
agency improperly and expansively interpreted an existing regulation to
support Alternative 2, and Alternative 2 impermissibly shifts the burden
of complying with a federal act onto state and local governments, as well
as individuals who are seeking floodplain development permits.183 This
Comment concludes that FEMA was unwise to implement Alternative 2
through its ROD.
FEMA’s abuse of authority in implementing Alternative 2 to address
the agency’s ESA-noncompliance is threefold. First, Alternative 2
imposes its Section 7 responsibilities onto state and local governments,
which do not have a legal responsibility to bear this burden.184 Second,
FEMA justifies its ability to shift the ESA compliance burden onto state
and local governments through Alternative 2 by interpreting an existing
regulation185 to support its delegation of this requirement; however, this
regulation does not support FEMA’s proposed requirement.186 Third, from
a public policy standpoint, requiring state and local governments and
individual permit seekers to maintain documentation that demonstrates
ESA compliance imposes a significant administrative and financial burden
on groups that do not have the responsibility, knowledge, expertise, or
resources to comply with the ESA.187

182. This analysis was influenced by the arguments written by a number of
commentators on the NPEIS. In particular, the author relied heavily on a letter written by
Molly Lawrence, Partner at Van Ness Feldman LLP. See Molly Lawrence, Partner, Van
Ness Feldman LLP, Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS to FEMA Regulatory Affairs
Division on behalf of Oregonians for Floodplain Protection (December 2, 2017) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Lawrence Letter]. Uncited statements are the author’s original
analysis or elaboration on the arguments made by commentators.
183. See infra Part III; see also Lawrence Letter.
184. See infra Section III.A.
185. See infra Section III.B.
186. See Sarah Kogel-Smucker, Assistant Corp. Counsel, N.Y.C. Law Dep’t, Comment
Letter
on
Proposed
NFIP
NPEIS
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0056 [hereinafter KogelSmucker Comment]; see also Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
187. See infra Section III.C.
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FEMA Impermissibly Shifts Its Section 7 ESA Compliance
Obligations onto NFIP Communities

Alternative 2 is a delegation of the agency’s Section 7 obligations
onto the state and local governments which are responsible for issuing
floodplain development permits, and the individuals who apply for these
permits.188 FEMA does not have the legal authority to delegate this
responsibility, as the federal government does not have the authority to
compel states to implement or enforce federal acts.189
Courts, BiOps, and settlement agreements found that FEMA’s
implementation of the NFIP does contribute to floodplain development.190
Accordingly, FEMA’s Section 7 obligations were triggered because three
particular components of FEMA’s federal agency action of administering
and implementing the NFIP were found by the aforementioned authorities
to be discretionary actions that had jeopardized ESA-listed species.191
Section 7 responsibilities are imposed on federal agencies for their
discretionary agency actions, not on state and local governments.192
Therefore, FEMA, not state and local governments, is responsible for
carrying out its Section 7 obligations in regards to the implementation of
the NFIP.193
A number of positions that FEMA stated in the NPEIS are germane
to this section of the analysis. First is FEMA’s position on its compliance
with the ESA:
The need to demonstrate compliance with the ESA stems from the
many and varying statements from Federal agencies and the public
about FEMA’s compliance with the ESA, and the perception about the
nature of the NFIP and its effects on ESA-listed species and designated
critical habitats. FEMA determined that it is currently in compliance
with the ESA, but recognized the need to make program changes that
demonstrate ESA compliance to the public.194

188. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
189. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
190. See supra Section II.C.
191. See supra Section II.C.
192. See supra Section II.B.
193. See supra Section II.B.
194. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 1-6 (emphasis added).
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Second is FEMA’s stance on whether the implementation of the NFIP
has an impact on floodplain development:
FEMA does not fund, authorize, or carry out private floodplain
development through the NFIP. Similarly, the NFIP does not cause
private floodplain development to occur. As discussed in Appendix C,
NFIP Biological Evaluation, available research and studies suggest
that the NFIP is not a determining factor in the decision of whether or
not to develop in the floodplain. Nevertheless, some perceive that
certain actions taken under the NFIP . . . encourage some floodplain
development.195

Third is FEMA’s position on its land use authority, and the legal
authority of state and local governments:
The power to regulate development in the floodplain, including
requiring and approving permits, inspecting property, and citing
violations requires land use authority. FEMA has no land use
authority. The regulation of land use falls under the State’s police
powers, which the Constitution reserves to the States, and the States
delegate this power down to their respective political subdivisions. The
NFIP was designed so that floodplain management would be carried
out at the State and local levels, where land use authority resides.196

Fourth is the agency’s stance on its role in floodplain development
and ESA compliance:
Moreover, these proposed program modifications do not constitute an
improper shift of FEMA’s Section 7 responsibilities under the ESA to
the communities or project proponents because the documentation
requirements relate to the compliance of private project proponents
with sections of the ESA that are applicable to private floodplain
development (i.e., Sections 9 and 10 of the ESA). FEMA does not
authorize, fund, undertake, or encourage private floodplain
development. As such, it has no responsibilities under Section 7 of the
ESA with respect to such private development.197

Ultimately, FEMA is confusing the issue at hand, and does not
address the three actions related to the implementation of the NFIP which
triggered its Section 7 obligations. Moreover, contrary to FEMA’s fourth
statement, FEMA is improperly shifting its Section 7 responsibilities onto
NFIP communities and individual permit applicants. FEMA does not have
195. Id. at 2-9 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 1-6 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 2-12 (emphasis added).
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the authority to impose the ESA documentation compliance requirement
on state and local governments, and individual permit applicants.198 There
are three other issues that make FEMA’s shift of this responsibility not just
impermissible, but also unscrupulous.
First, FEMA is clearly more concerned about the “perception” of its
compliance status with the ESA than with whether the agency is actually
in compliance with the ESA. Second, FEMA further detaches itself from
its Section 7 obligations by stating that the NFIP does not cause floodplain
development, as quoted in the second statement above; BiOps, however,
have found that NFIP implementation does indeed influence floodplain
development.199 Third, FEMA does not establish a federal nexus that
would justify imposing this requirement onto NFIP communities.200
FEMA altogether rejects its Section 7 obligations as related to floodplain
development, evidenced in FEMA’s fourth statement, which is suspicious
given years of litigation regarding that exact issue.201 Moreover, given that
FEMA disconnects itself from its own ESA-obligations, it is alarming that
FEMA in its Alternatives pins this obligation onto NFIP communities.
The first issue is FEMA’s supposed “perception” problem. Because
of the “perception” problem, FEMA believes that the agency needs to
make changes to the NFIP so that ESA compliance is demonstrated to the
public.202 However, FEMA’s “perception” issue stems from the reality of
findings of courts, settlements, and BiOps that the agency is not in
compliance with the ESA.203 By imposing ESA obligations on state and
local communities to “demonstrate ESA compliance to the public,”204 and
by amending the NFIP, FEMA is shifting its own burden to comply with
the ESA onto state and local governments which would then have to
address the issue.205
FEMA has an obligation to address the three components of NFIP
implementation that courts and BiOps have identified as FEMA’s ESAnoncompliance triggers, and to work to amend those actions so that the
“perception” of noncompliance dissipates. FEMA has taken responsibility
for its ESA-obligations before, particularly in Washington, where FEMA
198. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
199. See NMFS, WASH. BIO. OP., supra note 120, at 3; see also NMFS, OR. BIO. OP.,
supra note 123, at 141.
200. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
201. See supra Section II.C.
202. See supra text accompanying note 194.
203. See supra Section II.C.
204. See supra text accompanying note 194.
205. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
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addressed its responsibilities after the BiOp was issued, and took measures
to implement the RPAs suggested by the NMFS.206 However, around the
country FEMA still has ESA-obligations to address, which renders the
agency’s first statement—that FEMA is in compliance with the ESA—
suspect. For example, in Oregon, FEMA has yet to implement the RPAs
suggested by the NMFS in 2016.207 Because FEMA has not acted on its
obligations in Oregon, FEMA’s assertion that the agency is “currently in
compliance with the ESA”208 is questionable.
The second issue is FEMA’s rejection of the connection between
NFIP implementation and floodplain development. FEMA’s second
statement illustrates that it rejects the findings of courts and BiOps that
FEMA’s implementation of the NFIP does in fact have an impact on
floodplain development. The BE that FEMA refers to in its second
statement is a study that FEMA conducted and published in an appendix
to the NPEIS.209 The BE was conducted “pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA
to evaluate the potential effects of . . . the current implementation of the
NFIP, as modified by recent legislation and other proposed program
changes, on ESA-listed species and designated critical habitats within
floodplains across the nation.”210 The BE states that FEMA has no Section
7 obligations in regards to floodplain development because floodplain
development is not an NFIP action.211 Additionally, the BE reiterates
FEMA’s position on its land use authority, and the agency’s position that
it has nothing to do with issuing floodplain development permits, which
also means that this aspect of the NFIP falls outside of FEMA’s Section 7
obligations.212
Ultimately in the BE, FEMA maintains that the agency has “no
compliance responsibilities under the ESA with respect to private
floodplain development.”213 However, FEMA’s statements in the NPEIS
and BE are contrary to the findings of Washington and Oregon BiOps and
court holdings which have found that FEMA’s implementation of the
NFIP does indirectly contribute to floodplain development.214
206. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, No. C11-2044-RSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151386, at *12–13, *22–58 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2014), for the court’s discussion of
FEMA’s implementation of RPAs from the Washington BiOp.
207. See Rue Comment, supra note 136; see also Howard Comment, supra note 136.
208. See supra text accompanying note 194.
209. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, apps. at C-iii.
210. Id.
211. Id. apps. at C-vi.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See NMFS, WASH. BIO. OP., supra note 120, at 3; see also NMFS, OR. BIO. OP.,
supra note 123, at 141.
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The BE focuses its Section 7-obligation analysis on FEMA’s
issuance of flood insurance, FEMA’s floodplain management activities
through the minimum floodplain management criteria established by
FEMA, and the mapping program.215 Ultimately in the BE, FEMA
concludes that the Proposed Action of NFIP implementation with the
modifications from the proposed alternatives will have no effect on ESAlisted species or their habitats.216 However, FEMA’s findings in the BE are
contrary to the Washington and Oregon BiOps, which found that FEMA’s
floodplain management based on the minimum floodplain management
criteria and the mapping program do have an effect on ESA-listed species
and their habitats.217
FEMA’s alarming departure from the findings of courts and BiOps
was also highlighted by commentators during the NPEIS’s draft stage. A
number of commentators took issue with the fact that FEMA stated that
there was no connection between the implementation of the NFIP and
floodplain development.218 One commentator went so far as to criticize the
NPEIS as “devoid of historical context and reality,” and explained that
“[t]he NFIP does, in fact, promote the development of floodplains through
the land use and mapping criteria, 44 C.F.R. Parts 60.3 and 65,
respectively.”219
The third issue is that FEMA imposes an ESA compliance
requirement on state and local governments when FEMA failed to
establish a nexus that would trigger a non-federal government agency’s
responsibility for federal requirements that FEMA would impose through
Alternative 2.220 While there is an obligation under Section 9 of the ESA
for individuals to not “take” a listed species, and under Section 10 of the
ESA exception permits can be sought, Section 7 of the ESA is geared

215. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, apps. at C-v.
216. Id. apps. at C-xii.
217. See NMFS, WASH. BIO. OP., supra note 120, at 83; see also NMFS, OR. BIO. OP.,
supra note 123, at 141.
218. See Chad Berginnis, Exec. Dir., Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, Inc.,
Comment
Letter
on
Proposed
NFIP
NPEIS
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0059;
Bob Sallinger,
Conservation Dir., Audubon Soc’y of Portland, Comment Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS
(June 6, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0075; Joel
Scata, Attorney, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Comment Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS (June
6, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0069.
219. Rob Evans, State Floodplain Manager/NFIP Coordinator, VT Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, Comment Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS (June 6, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0058.
220. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
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toward federal agencies and their discretionary actions that effect ESAlisted species and their habitats.221
FEMA’s third position, quoted above, illustrates that FEMA does not
believe it has any connection to issuing development permits, and that this
authority is instead vested in state and local governments. Because FEMA
has disconnected itself from the permit process, and effectively severed a
federal connection by doing so, the agency has no authority to dictate that,
as a condition of issuing a floodplain development permit, the issuing
agency must obtain and maintain documentation of compliance with the
ESA.222 In fact, FEMA is not the agency responsible for administering the
ESA, and thus has even less authority to impose an ESA requirement on
state and local governments.223 Overall, the federal government cannot
force a federal requirement onto state and local governments.224
Moreover, FEMA further severs the nexus with its fourth position,
quoted above. Molly Lawrence (“Lawrence”), an attorney representing the
non-profit corporation Oregonians for Floodplain Protection, poignantly
argues in an NPEIS commentary letter to FEMA the key problem with
FEMA’s impermissible shift in responsibility.225 Lawrence writes, “If
FEMA has no Section 7 responsibility with respect to floodplain
development, there is simply no basis for incorporating ESA compliance
requirements into the eligibility requirements for NFIP. FEMA cannot add
these additional burdens to local communities based on a perception—that
the NFIP causes floodplain development—that FEMA firmly
disavows.”226
Ultimately, FEMA is circumventing its Section 7 obligations, which
courts and the Services have established, by imposing the ESA compliance
documentation requirement on NFIP communities. FEMA’s NPEIS and
Alternative 2 mask the root of the agency’s ESA-problem that FEMA has
a legal obligation to confront. Instead of imposing this requirement,
FEMA should amend its implementation of the NFIP to address the three
components that are connected to ESA noncompliance.

221. See supra Section II.B.
222. See also Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
223. See Section II.B for a discussion of ESA administration, which is done by the
Services.
224. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997). See also Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
225. Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
226. Id.
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FEMA Improperly Interprets an Existing Regulation as its
Legal Authority to Enforce Alternative 2

In Alternative 2, FEMA relies on 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) to impose
ESA compliance responsibilities on to state and local governments, and
parties seeking development permits.227 The overall regulation at 44
C.F.R. § 60.3 sets out the minimum floodplain management criteria for
NFIP communities, and 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) governs the permitting
aspect of the minimum floodplain management criteria:
When the Federal Insurance Administrator has not defined the SFHA
within a community, has not provided water surface elevation data, and
has not provided sufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal high
hazard area, but the community has indicated the presence of such
hazards by submitting an application to participate in the Program, the
community shall . . . review proposed development to assure that all
necessary permits have been received from those governmental
agencies from which approval is required by Federal or State law,
including section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.228

In Alternative 2, FEMA is relying on existing regulation 44 C.F.R. §
60.3(a)(2) to impose the requirement of obtaining and maintaining
documentation regarding ESA compliance onto NFIP communities.229
However, FEMA is improperly interpreting its own regulation to impose
this requirement onto state and local governments.230
Currently, the doctrine that governs agency interpretation of its own
regulations comes from Auer v. Robbins.231 Auer “provides that courts will
uphold agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations unless they are
plainly erroneous, on the theory that the agency should know what its own

227. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-16.
228. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
229. Note that each Alternative proposes a different method for imposing this
requirement. See FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-16 to -17. Alternative 3
proposes enacting new regulations to mandate the ESA compliance documentation
requirement. Id. at 2-16. Based on the language of Alternative 4, it is unclear whether
FEMA intends to interpret 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) to support its mandate, or if it would
enact new regulations to impose the requirement. Id. at 2-17.
230. See Lawrence Comment, supra note 182; see also Kogel-Smucker Comment,
supra note 186.
231. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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regulation means.”232 However, since that decision was handed down, the
doctrine has been challenged.233
Although this issue has not yet reached the courts, there is a case to
be made at the outset that FEMA’s interpretation of 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2)
is questionable. FEMA maintains that the agency is clarifying the “all
necessary permits” language of 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) to mean that “the
community must obtain and maintain documentation of compliance with
the ESA for proposed floodplain development.”234 In addition to placing
an ESA compliance requirement on issuing permits, FEMA would require
the community or project proponent to provide documentation of
compliance with the ESA before a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) or
Letter of Map Revision-Based on Fill (LOMR-F) request is processed.235
FEMA’s justification for this requirement is as follows:
By documenting that the private floodplain development for which a
LOMR or LOMR-F is sought is ESA-compliant, FEMA can
demonstrate that it is only issuing LOMRs or LOMR-Fs for ESAcompliant floodplain development (and, thus, not encouraging
floodplain development that adversely impacts ESA-listed species and
designated critical habitat).236

Germane to this analysis is FEMA’s position on expanding 44 C.F.R. §
60.3(a)(2) to include a requirement of ESA compliance documentation
retention as part of the NFIP. FEMA maintains:
[The agency] is not, through these proposed program modifications,
expanding the requirements applicable to private floodplain
development under the ESA. Project proponents of private floodplain
development have always been required to ensure their project does
not cause a “take” in violation of Section 9 of the ESA, or in the
alternative, to secure a Section 10 incidental take permit authorizing
the incidental take of threatened and endangered species. FEMA is
merely clarifying that the existing requirement under 44 C.F.R. §
232. Jud Mathews, Presidential Administration in the Obama Era 11 (Jan. 31, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927494.
233. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, at 1212–13 (2015) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (explaining that Auer deference to agencies is a problem because it will
leave agency power unchecked because the agency will be able to write regulations as
broadly as it wants, so that the agency can later interpret its regulations at its will); see also
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 548 U.S. 597 (2013); Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 576 U.S. 142 (2012); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006); Mathews supra note 232, at 11.
234. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-12.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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60.3(a)(2)—that NFIP-participating communities ensure that all
required Federal permits are obtained as a condition of issuing a permit
for development in the floodplain—also includes a documentation
requirement so that FEMA can verify that the community is
implementing and enforcing this requirement.237

Although FEMA maintains that the agency is not expanding the
requirements applicable to private floodplain development by interpreting
44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) to support the ESA compliance documentation
requirement, that is exactly what FEMA is doing. To be sure, 44 C.F.R. §
60.3(a)(2) requires NFIP communities to ensure that necessary permits
have been received from the federal or state agencies that issue the
applicable permits as part of the floodplain development permit process.238
However, FEMA does not draw a clear connection between maintaining
ESA-compliance documentation with acquiring “necessary permits.”
Because FEMA does not justify the ESA compliance documentation
requirement, FEMA is in fact expanding the requirements applicable to
private floodplain developers. Moreover, those looking to develop
property already have an obligation under Section 9 of the ESA to ensure
that they are not “taking” ESA-listed species through their actions.239
Because there is already an ESA obligation on those individuals through
Section 9, it is bizarre that FEMA is adding this requirement to the NFIP
through a regulation that has to do with minimum floodplain management
criteria, and it is similarly bizarre that FEMA is imposing the requirement
onto state and local governments responsible for permitting. This is a clear
example of FEMA circumventing their Section 7 obligations.
Moreover, based on the language of Alternative 2, FEMA conditions
the issuance of the permit on whether the permit-issuer in the NFIP
community obtains and maintains ESA-compliance documentation.240
This condition in itself is not supported by the language of 44 C.F.R. §
60.3(a)(2). The regulation requires that before a permit is issued, necessary
federal and state permits are received by the applicant; whether the permitissuer of the NFIP community maintains documentation of compliance
with the ESA has no bearing on whether the permit applicant has obtained
the necessary permits required by the applicant to receive a floodplain
development permit.241
237. Id.
238. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) (2018).
239. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
240. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-16.
241. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182; see also Kogel-Smucker Comment, supra
note 186.
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In Alternative 2, FEMA abuses its discretion to interpret the
regulation as the agency see fits. This interpretation of 44 C.F.R. §
60.3(a)(2) is an abuse of discretion because such an interpretation
effectively forces NFIP communities to ensure that the permit and the
resulting development will not violate the ESA, which in turn will help
FEMA convey to the public that the NFIP is ESA-compliant.242 However,
FEMA, not NFIP communities, is responsible for bringing the NFIP into
compliance with Section 7 of the ESA because FEMA is the program
administrator.243
FEMA is responsible for how the agency’s governance of the
minimum floodplain management criteria244 impacts the agency’s
compliance with the ESA.245 Therefore, FEMA abuses its authority by
reading 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2), the minimum floodplain management
criteria regulation, to require state and local governments to bear the
responsibility to demonstrate compliance with the ESA, when there is
judicial history that identifies that FEMA is responsible for addressing the
minimum floodplain management criteria to bring FEMA into compliance
with Section 7 of the ESA.
As highlighted in Section II.C, courts have held FEMA responsible
for Section 7 compliance for three components of the NFIP.246 In the
NPEIS, FEMA writes that they are in favor of imposing the ESA
compliance requirement on NFIP communities so they can ensure
compliance with the ESA.247 However, FEMA is effectively forcing the
compliance work onto parties in NFIP communities who do not have a
legal responsibility to demonstrate this compliance, which is especially
troublesome since FEMA has a responsibility to amend its implementation
of the NFIP to reach ESA compliance.
C.

The ESA Compliance Requirement of Alternative 2 is a
Significant Burden on NFIP Communities

Another central problem with Alternative 2 in imposing ESA
compliance obligations onto state and local governments responsible for
issuing floodplain development permits, and individuals seeking these
permits, is that NFIP communities do not have the bandwidth to manage
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See Kogel-Smucker Comment, supra note 186.
See supra Section II.B.
44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(2) (2018).
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 236.
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ESA responsibilities. ESA compliance requires funding and individuals
who have the knowledge and expertise to navigate this complicated and
dense federal act.248 Additionally, the NPEIS vaguely describes the
expectations and instructions for state and local governments who are
expected to manage this new requirement.249
A number of commentators on the NPEIS were officials from city
governments, and their letters described the ESA compliance requirements
as “overly burdensome” and “costly and challenging.”250 The City of
Portland highlighted that “[Alternative 2] will require new review
procedures, ensuring staff has the appropriate knowledge and skills to
review application materials for compliance with federal rules, in addition
to local and state rules; and it will require applicants to invest notably more
time, money, and effort in their projects.”251 Similarly, attorneys from the
City of New York Law Department stated:
[T]he City agencies that review development applications, Department
of Buildings and the New York City Department of Small Business
Services, do not have the staff or resources to affirmatively engage in
the correspondence needed to document ESA compliance on behalf of
a private applicant for all floodplain development, nor to maintain
records of this documentation.252

Additionally, officials from Oregon and Washington highlight that
for their states, Alternative 2 creates an even more taxing situation because
both of these states have directives from BiOps and RPAs that need to be
addressed by FEMA, and changes to NFIP implementation that would
result from Alternative 2 further confuses their situations.253
Although FEMA does provide an overview of how it envisions the
ESA compliance process, this overview is not nearly as comprehensive as
it needs to be.254 In terms of the amount of time FEMA believes it will take
for NFIP communities to comply with the proposed changes, “FEMA
estimates that a community would spend an average of approximately 30
minutes (0.5 hours) reviewing, processing, filing, and maintaining ESA
248. See Howard Comment, supra note 136; see also Kogel-Smucker Comment, supra
note 186.
249. See FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, at 2-1 to -17, apps. at I-1 to -7.
250. See Howard Comment, supra note 136; see also Kogel-Smucker Comment, supra
note 186.
251. See Howard Comment, supra note 136.
252. See Lawrence Letter, supra note 182.
253. See Rue Comment, supra note 136; see also David Radabaugh, State NFIP
Coordinator, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Comment Letter on Proposed NFIP NPEIS (June 6,
2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FEMA-2012-0012-0068.
254. FEMA, NFIP NPEIS, supra note 17, apps. at I-1.
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documentation.”255 However, FEMA does not specify the increment on
this estimate. Is the estimate that communities will spend 30 minutes every
year, every month, every week, every day, every hour on the new ESA
compliance requirement? Moreover, FEMA does not specify whether this
is 30 minutes per application or in general.
Additionally, “FEMA assumes this action would be completed by the
equivalent of a general and operations manager.”256 However, general and
operations managers likely do not have the knowledge or expertise to carry
out the process of “reviewing [and] processing”257 ESA-compliance
documentation. FEMA estimates that it would cost communities $369,278
to $3,232,456, with a mid-estimate of $1,846,388, per year for the
communities to retain ESA-related documentation.258 Whether a
community faces a cost on the low, mid, or high end of FEMA’s estimate,
the entire spectrum of costs poses a significant financial burden for
communities to bear.
D.

Recommendation

Ultimately, FEMA needs to address its ESA-noncompliance headon. The agency needs to implement changes to the three components of
the NFIP that courts, settlements, and BiOps have identified as actions that
put ESA-species at risk. One way to address this is for FEMA to look to
the RPAs recommended by the NMFS in the Washington and Oregon
BiOps, and attempt to apply those recommendations to the three
components of NFIP implementation, not just to the implementation of the
NFIP in Washington and Oregon, but to other parts of the country. If those
recommendations are too specific to Washington and Oregon, FEMA
should look to those recommendations as models for how they should
adapt their implementation in other parts of the country.
Ultimately, FEMA unwisely chose to implement Alternative 2 to
address the agency’s responsibility to update the NFIP because Alternative
2 impermissibly delegates ESA obligations onto NFIP communities. If
FEMA feels strongly that state and local governments and individual
permit applicants should be responsible for demonstrating ESA
compliance, then FEMA should enact a new regulation mandating this

255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. apps. at I-2.
Id.
Id.
Id. apps. at I-3.
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requirement which would go through a public notice and comment
process.259
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NFIP and the ESA are both massive, detailed, and complex
statutes that have many positive intended outcomes. However, FEMA’s
administration and implementation of the NFIP has caused a clash
between these two acts, which resulted in more harm than good despite the
noble intentions of both of these acts.260 In an effort to manage the NFIP,
FEMA has jeopardized ESA-listed species, and FEMA has a legal
obligation to address the issues that its actions have caused.261
The NPEIS262 is a step in the right direction for FEMA to address the
environmental impacts caused by its implementation of the NFIP.
However, within the NPEIS, FEMA has failed to effectively address its
ESA obligations because the proposed alternatives to NFIP
implementation do not address the root of FEMA’s ESA problem.263
Rather, through the proposed alternatives, specifically Alternative 2,
FEMA impermissibly shifts its federal obligations onto state and local
governments and individual permit-seekers.264 By shifting its
responsibilities, FEMA abuses and misconstrues its authority, and also
generates an extensive burden on these groups.265 FEMA should not
implement Alternative 2 and instead should focus its attention on
amending the three components of NFIP implementation that are the root
of FEMA’s ESA-troubles so that the agency will come into compliance
with Section 7 of the ESA.266

259. See Lawrence Comment, supra note 182; see also Kogel-Smucker Comment,
supra note 186.
260. See supra Sections II.C, III.A.
261. See supra Section II.C.
262. See supra Section II.D.
263. See supra Section III.
264. See supra Section III.A.
265. See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
266. See supra Section III.D.

